Archive for May, 2007

On logic

Thursday, May 24th, 2007

As part of my postgraduate life here in Edinburgh, I’m expected to tutor a couple of dozen first (of four) year undergraduate Mathematics students. Thus I was involved in the marking of their group theory exam last Friday. As the questions were being assigned to markers, there seemed to be a reluctance to take the logic question, probably because students manage to tie themselves in hard-to-follow knots with this material. However, I spent some of my previous year at Bath tutoring on set theory and logic to Physicists, so was prepared for the worst, and I’d also spotted that the question was multiple choice, so the actual marking shouldn’t be too taxing, so I took responsibility for that one.

Still, 207 scripts later I was somewhat worried by the general standard. There were quite a few attempts which received full marks, but many more received zero, including elsewhere high-scoring candidates. Whilst the emphasis of a group theory exam should be group theory, the pressure of an exam and lack of access to notes will always dampen performance, and I probably received a few scripts that were pure guesswork, that’s still a disappointment. Whilst it pains me to say it, a student could become competent at first year undergraduate mathematics just by learning how to ‘turn the handle’ of appropriate bits of mathematical machinery, and as this is pretty much all that they do at school, they may find that university-level mathematics isn’t really the subject they thought it was. To make the leap from computation to understanding, it strikes me as vital to gain mastery of basic logical manipulation. Nor should this just be the domain of Mathematicians; if anything, a precise understanding of the structure of an argument (and its falsification) should be even more crucial to the Humanities.

So I’m going to reproduce the question here and then attempt to unravel it in a precise manner but without recourse to the more abstract approaches of formal logic, in the hope that everyone can follow. Here goes:

Consider the statements:

A. All people who can sing in tune are musical.

B. Some people who cannot sing in tune are musical.

C. Some unmusical people can sing in tune.

D. Some unmusical people cannot sing in tune.

E. No unmusical person can sing in tune.

Mark with the number 1 any of the statements B,C,D,E that are logically equivalent to statement A, with 2 any that are (logically equivalent to) the negation of A, with 3 any that are (logically equivalent to) the converse of A, with 4 any that are (logically equivalent to) the negation of the converse of A and with 0 any which are in none of the above categories.

Solution is behind the cut, so if you want to try this yourself without spoilers, now’s the time!

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The Secrecy Problem

Thursday, May 3rd, 2007

I took a number of interesting modules in formal logic as an undergraduate, and I’m often fascinated by ideas in this field. There are natural connections between cryptographic protocol analysis and string rewriting, and with enough freedom one can emulate general models of computation such as Turing machines by protocols. One particularly neat side effect of this is that it allows an elegant proof of the undecidability of the secrecy problem: namely, given a protocol and a secret message, is there a decision procedure to establish whether an intruder can learn the secret? By reducing to Post’s Correspondence Problem, it can be shown that the answer is no! Of course, this raises issues of intruder strength and ‘honest’ protocols; I’ve written up some of these ideas (along with the proof and an outline of PCP) over on e2.